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Summary: Over the years the EU wine policy has introduced a number of 
instruments with the principal goal of addressing the problems of the internal market 
and price stability, controlling supply and farmers’ incomes. Regarding trade policy, 
it has acted to improve its competitiveness against growing competition from Third 
Countries, by building both tariffs and non-tariff measures for trade policy. While 
continuing on the path of reform which started in the early 1990s, it was only with 
the 2008 and 2013 reforms that wine policy changed significantly from a policy 
based on subsidising production and the protection of domestic markets from non-
European producers, to a policy that aims to stimulate quality production and 
the competitiveness of the wine sector on the international scene. The Common 
Agricultural Policy and the EU domestic and international contexts have (probably) 
played an important role in the design of strategies for wine interventions. What is 
going on in the EU wine sector and what are the consequences of the wine policies 
on the market? This paper follows the evolution of EU wine policies through three 
main phases that, according to the authors’ point of view, have characterised the 
EU’s aims and strategies during the years of the reforms. Specifically, the authors 
focus their analysis on the budget expenditures of each phase (from 1970 to 2015) 
and the market response in the domestic and international scenario. 
The thread which runs through this paper is that the controversial aspects of the 
wine sector are urgent requests from wine farms to both policymakers to intervene 
with market laws and rules, and to the policy itself which aims to correct its 
own failings. EU policy has arrived late (too late) to understand the increasing 
threat posed by the competitive growth of third countries. After 46 years of 
implementation, the ‘classic dilemma’ between policymakers and markets, the trade-
offs between markets and policy, are still the drivers of EU wine policy.
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Introduction 
Over the years, the Common Market Organisation (CMO) has been the 
regulatory basis of the EU wine market, covering, through quite a strong 
vertically ruled approach, most of the wine industry; from quantity 
management of production to quality appellation, from labelling rules to the 
third countries trade Agreements. Following, at least in part, the objectives 
of the Common Agricultural Policy, cap (Article 40 tfeu), the wine policy 
has introduced a number of instruments designed to address the problems of 
income stability, controlling supply and to improve competitiveness. 
The Commission’s aims of the early 1970s, that CMO policies should 
encourage the wine sector to bring supply in line with demand in terms of 
both quantity and quality have almost been overturned. 
The EU is still the first wine producing area with around 60% of world 
production, but Europe’s share of the world’s vineyards has declined from 
63% in 2000 to 54% in 2014, the effect of EU permanent abandonment 
premiums, ended in 2011 (oiv, 2015). In the meantime, the share of all 
other world wine regions is increasing, in particular in Asia, which now 
accounts for 25% of the world’s vineyards; wine has become one of the 
most globalised products in the world. Even if the globalisation phenomenon 
is not new for the wine sector (Anderson, 2004), its influence over the 
years has changed significantly. One indicator of that is the growth of wine 
exports from third countries, which reached 20 million hl in volume in 
2015; only 20 years before, in 1995, the export was about 11 million hl. The 
EU wine market is still dominated by Spain, France and Italy as the main 
EU exporting countries, and Germany and UK are the leading importers 
(Eurostat, 2016). On the demand and consumers’ side, globalisation has had a 
profound impact. Social and religious culture, diet issues and alcohol policies 
have contributed to major changes in the geography of consumption: with a 
reduction in the traditional EU wine countries versus outside the EU. 
However, the quite strong, vertically ruled system mentioned above, has 
often been considered to be overly regulated (Anderson, 2016; Pomarici & 
Sardone, 2009; Sphani, 1988). The EU domestic context and international 
scenes have (probably) played an important role in the design of wine strategies 
and interventions, since their inception in 1962. Historically speaking, the EU 
has often been accused of having policies to achieve protectionist goals: from 
distortive interventions in the 1970s and 1980s to less distortive payments 
in the 1990s (after the MacSharry reform), to decoupled payments in the 
2000s (after the Fischler Reform), to target payments from 2010 until 2013 
(Anania & Pupo d’Andrea, 2015). Thus generating imbalances in the domestic 
context between agriculture in the north of Europe and the Mediterranean, 
and between the policies for supporting the agricultural incomes (I pillar) and 
those focused on the rural development programme (RD). As Swinnen argued 
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(2015), the main pressures for cap reforms were trade negotiations, budgetary 
pressures, rising food safety and environmental concerns, and the forthcoming 
eastern enlargement. Financial aspects and pressure from the commencement 
of the gatt negotiations (wto considers most EU expenditure to be trade 
distorting and therefore restricting) were probably among the most important 
contributing factors in determining the reorientation of EU agricultural policies, 
including the wine sector (Josling & Tangermann, 2014; Matthews et al., 2017). 
In addition, the recent Brexit and the negotiation of free-trade agreements 
(Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, ceta with Canada and 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, ttip with the usa) have 
changed the international game. Recently, debates on cap and the CMO have 
seen new decision makers involved. The EU Parliament was involved under 
the co-decision procedure to the last cap and CMO (including the wine sector) 
reforms for the period 2014-2020 (EU Parliament, 2012b). After 46 years 
of implementation, the cap and its CMOs is one of the most integrated EU 
policies and accounts for the largest share of the EU budget (38% by 20131). 
Since the beginning of the CMO, what have been the effects of EU wine 
policies on the domestic scenario and on the international competition? What 
has happened during implementation to wine policies? In what direction are 
the wine policy changes going? 
Many economists have been addressing wine policies and their effects 
(such as Anderson, 2004, 2014; Anderson & Jensen, 2016; Coleman, 2010; 
Dal Bianco et al., 2015; Malassi, 1959, Montaigne & Cohelo, 2006; Corsinovi 
& Gaeta, 2016; Meloni & Swinnen, 2013; Niederbarcher, 1983; Pomarici & 
Sardone, 2001, 2009; Sphani, 1988). This paper follows the evolution of EU 
wine policies through three main phases that, according to the authors’ point 
of view, have characterised the EU’s aims and strategies during the years 
of the reforms. Specifically, the authors focus their analysis on the budget 
expenditures of each phase (from 1970 to 2015)2 and the market response in 
the domestic and international scenario. 
1. EU wine policies: impact expected, instruments and costs
Although the foundation had been established in 1962, the true organisation 
of the wine market did not come about until 1970 with the passage of the 
1. This is equal to 363 billion euros of the 960 billion total (EU) (50 billion euros/year). 
This is a significant reduction compared to the 417 billion euros (2007-2014).
2. In this paper, the expenditures have been collected from the eaggf (European 
Guarantee and Guidance Fund) and from the Reports of the National Support Programmes 
declared by the Member States (annual financial report). The dataset covers the CMO’s 
expenditures (included in the guarantee fund and the EU’s own budget), but not the rural 
development funds and other co-financing supports from EU countries. 
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CMO wine. The Commission’ newsletter, which announced the entry into 
force of the wine policy, highlighted the objectives to be pursued “the 
common wine policy sets out to do two things: to adjust supply to demand 
and to raise quality standards throughout” (EU Commission N. 9/1970). 
The two formal regulations were published in 1970: one related to 
interventions on table wines (Reg. 816/1970) and the other concerning 
production of quality wines produced in specific region, Qwpsr (Reg. 
817/1970). These two regulations remained separate until 1999 with Reg. 
1493/1999. The idea was that wines with a quality designation would be 
autonomous within the table wine CMO and that two markets would exist; 
one for ordinary wine (or table wines) and one for quality wines (Scoppola 
et al., 1997; Pomarici & Sardone, 2001). Up until this point, quality wine 
was only regulated at Member State level and no EU rules existed (Meloni & 
Swinnen, 2013).
The policy went through the major reforms in 1987 (Reg. 822/87), in 
1999 (Reg. 1493/99) as a part of Agenda 2000, in 2008 (Reg. 479/08) and 
in 2013 under the cap reform (single CMO, Reg. 1308/13). The wine CMO 
maintained its autonomy until 2008 when the wine sector was included in the 
single CMO regulation covering all agricultural products. 
The following table 1 shows the three phases identified by the authors, the 
expected impact by the EU Commission, and the main instruments adopted in 
force and their time of implementation. The first phase (Phase 1), referred to as 
“price and income support”, has followed the objective of market equilibrium 
by reducing surplus wine quantities and guaranteeing the income stability of 
producers (such as distillations, or aid for storage or buying alcohol). 
The second phase (Phase 2) could be identified as the “quality phase”. It 
saw the introduction of a set of instruments to control production with the 
aim of adapting supply to market demand, improving production potential 
and management, and restructuring production potential in terms of quality 
and quantity (such as the aids for grubbing up and permanent abandonment; 
restructuring; green harvesting; harvest insurances). The third phase (Phase 
3), starting mainly with the 2008 Reform, marks officially the new policy 
orientation focusing on the “competitiveness” of quality wines. Most of the 
instruments included in table 1 were financed through financial support from 
the EU. The authors have also included additional instruments implemented 
during the three phases and strictly connected with the EU Commission’s 
expected impact, but without any expenditure items, (ban on planting/ and 
planting rights; authorisation system; quality wines and PDO and PGI; 
rules on oenological practices and requirements for import). Even if indirect 
costs (such as administrative) were incurred to the National Member States’ 
budgets for managing their implementations. 
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Table 1 - The development of EU wine policies through three main phases
Phases Expected Impact Instruments Implementation
Phase 1
“Price & Income 
support” 
– Market equilibrium 
by reducing surplus 
quantities
– Income stability of 
producers







Buying-in of alcohol 
from compulsory 
distillation
















– Adapt vine supply to 
market demand
– Improve production 
potential management 




in term of quality and 
quantity
– Limit the production 















Rules of oenological 
practices











2008 - on going
Phase 3
“Competitiveness”
– Improve competition 
of quality wines
– Improve development 
& innovation of quality 
wines








Source: Authors’ creation 
Notes: * Distillation schemes covered the aid for: obligatory distillation of table wine (1982), 
voluntary distillation (1976 – table wine), compulsory distillation of by-products of wine-
making, crisis distillations (1999), potable alcohol distillation (1999), distillation of dual-
purpose grapes (1987), and preventive distillation (1987)
** Regulatory measures regarding single payments scheme sps, and mutual funds
*** Other intervention expenditures are the sum of incentives linked to income and price 
support
**** Abandonment of vineyards premiums covered aid for temporary and permanent 
abandonment
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As indicated in Table 2 the budget destined to support the wine sector 
was almost 44 billion euros. In that period, the vast majority of budgetary 
expenditures comprised subsidies for phase 1 (almost 70%); followed by 25% 
phase 2 and 4% phase 3. 








%  of total 
budget
Phase 1 31,160,6 70.7 1,106.6 17.7
Phase 2 11,073.0 25.1 2,769.1 44.4
Phase 3 1,825.6 4.2 2,364.6 37.9
Total 44,059.2 6,240.3
Source: Financial Report, European Commission (2016)
According to the financial scheme of the EU and Reg. 1308/2013, the 
wine budget for the period 2014-2018 is still almost 1 billion per year3 
(6.240 billions in total). Phase 1 will account 17% on the total budget, (with 
by product distillation and single payment scheme); phase 2 about 44% 
(with restructuring and vineyards reconversion; replanting of vineyards for 
health or phytosanitary reasons; harvest insurance and green harvesting) 
and phase 3 with 37.9% on the total with the measures linked to support the 
competitiveness (promotion; investments and innovation).
2. The first CMO phase: aims, instruments and costs
Phase 1 has dominated the scene for more than forty years achieving 
the goal to “stabilize markets and ensure a fair standard of living for the 
agricultural community concerned” (Preamble, Reg. 822/87) by finding some 
balance between wine production and market outlets, and provides for price 
support (Sphani, 1988). More specifically many forms of distillations were 
3. Budget to be shared among the EU wine producing countries. From 2008 resources 
were distributed via national envelope (National Programme Support, nps). The regulation 
was based on measures that can be achieved through national support programmes managed 
directly by the Member States according to their strategies. 
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implemented4, with the expectation to achieve market equilibrium by reducing 
surplus quantities. The objectives were to guarantee a fair price for producers 
and create more effective measures to tackle growing market surpluses. From 
1970 to 1999 (Table 1) with the goal to remove wine and alcohol from 
the market, the EU introduced market withdrawals and the buying-in of 
alcohol from compulsory distillation. Distillations were originally intended 
as temporary measures designed to address short-term imbalances, however, 
they have promoted production of undesirable table wine, and they have 
encouraged the continued production of table wine. As a consequence, they 
have converted the wine surplus problem into the problem of alcohol surplus, 
generated from distillation (Kortteinen, 1984). As shown in Table 3, the 
spending for the distillations scheme had its peak between 1981 and 1990 and 
during 1991-2000. Together with the market withdrawals of wine spending 
has risen more than 3 billion euros between 1991 and 2000. The buying-in 
of alcohol from compulsory distillation amounted to more than 20% of the 
payments in the whole period (2001-2010) with an average cost of around 1.5 
billion euros. The aids have reduced thanks to the gradual disappearance of 
the measures by 2011. Looking at the average annual distillations in the main 
wine producing countries, Table 4 shows that 21% of total EU wine production 
was distilled between 1981/94, and it has been reduced to 11% between 
2007/11. In the same period, the volume distilled has gradually decreased until 
2007/11, also due to the “phasing out” of these measures (2009-2011). France, 
Italy and Spain have progressively reduced the volume distilled from 1981/94 
(40 million hectolitres) to 2007/20011 (14.5 million hectolitres). 
Phase 1 was also represented by the aids for concentrated grape must 
(Table 3). It was meant to balance the increasing costs of producers in 
southern and northern wine growing regions: in order to compensate for the 
competitive disadvantage suffered due to the higher cost of enrichment using 
must incurred by producers who were banned from using sugar to regulate 
alcoholic strength. The aid had its peak between 1991 and 2000 (Table 3) 
with a total of about 1.3 billion euros.
4. 1) Obligatory distillation of wine from dual-purpose grapes, which originate from 
other grape wine varieties or dual-purpose grapes produced in excess of the normal verified 
quantity. 2) Obligatory distillation of by-products as wine lees and grape marc. 3) Voluntary 
distillation for table wine or distillation “with a guarantee of proper use” for those with long-
term storage contracts. A few years later, with the Reform in 1987 three distillations were 
voluntary and could be chosen by the producer: 1) distillation supplementary to long-term 
storage contracts; 2) preventive distillation; and 3) support distillation. Whereas the remaining 
three were compulsory: 1) distillation of by-products; 2) distillation of wines other than table 
wines and 3) distillation of table wines. The ‘99 (Reg. 1493/99) reform provided for two types 
of compulsory distillation: 1) wine obtained from dual-purpose grapes and 2) by-product 
distillation; and two types of voluntary distillation: 3) for the production of potable alcohol 
and 4) crisis distillation. 
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Table 4 - Annual distillations by Member States (in million hectolitres)
Volume Distilled % of wine production
Countries 1981/94 1994/07 2007/11 1981/94 1994/07 2007/11
France 14.2 7.7 1.5 21 19 9
Italy 14 7.4 5.3 21 10 9
Spain 9 5.1 3.0 26 13 20
Total EU 40 21.6 14.5 21 13 11
Source: Report EU Commission (1987) - European Commission (2006a, 2006b)
The Commission’s proposal (EU Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2006c) was 
to abolish the use of sugar as well as the support for the use of concentrated 
grape must, but the Commission’s change in attitude after significant pressure 
from the northern European countries forced Mediterranean countries, where 
such practices are not permitted, to maintain their demand for compensatory 
measures for musts and to support the need for a stricter regulation on 
enrichment. As a consequence, the aid was abolished, through progressive 
reduction of support: a “phasing out” from 2009-2012. This aid represents an 
example of how the Commission has taken control of the agreement, making 
the reform process probably more conservative (and protectionist) than the 
initial more liberalist proposal, due to its will/need to meet the interests of 
the (northern European) Member States and sectorial representatives5. Aid for 
private storage was created in order to avoid an excessively large fall in prices 
when the market was saturated and to compensate for storage costs. The 
storage for table wine and grape musts should have encouraged producers to 
take surplus wine off the market, thus supporting market price stabilisation. 
Among the “regulatory measures” (phase 1), the authors have included two 
interventions in accordance with the CMO Regulation 479/2008: single 
payments scheme and mutual funds. Direct payments under the single 
payment scheme were based on reference amounts of direct payments that 
were received in the past or on regionalised per hectare amount. The measure 
is still force in the 2014-2018 programmes. The mutual funds, strongly 
desired by the Commission (also in Reg. 1308/2013), and introduced with 
the aim to generate resources to provide income support to companies in 
crisis situations, have not found the interest of any member country, with no 
subsidies allocated. 
5. The EU Commission proposed to abolish from 2008, all the aids for distillations and 
concentrate grape musts.
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This phase, was also characterised by a series of intervention measures, 
some of which have since been replaced, e.g. export subsidies, import 
and export certificates for products, compensatory rates and the Common 
Customs Tariff, which was applied by all EU Member States. 
The tariff protection aimed to protect the internal market from an influx 
of non-eec products. It was a mixed system, made up of a customs duty and 
a compensatory rate that was applied only once the duty and the amount 
spent by the importer to get their product onto the European market dropped 
below the guide price. Export refunds on the other hand protected European 
exporters trading on the global market. This measure consisted of refunding 
to the exporter the difference between the guide price and the amount spent 
on transport, and the price received on the world market. Though less than in 
the early 1990s, trade measures continue to protect the competitive position 
of domestic wine producers in the EU market. In order to comply with 
gatt requirements, expenditure on export refunds had to be reduced and 
eliminated with the 2008 Reform. 
2.1. The markets’ response to phase 1
The wine market in the EU has been characterised for decades by what EU 
Commission documents typically refer to as “structural imbalances” with an 
increase in surpluses and decrease in consumption (EU Commission, 2006a). 
In the main wine producing countries (Graph 1), wine production peaked 
around 1980, particularly in Italy and France with more than 80 Mhl. Spain 
saw a more modest change in production levels up to 1990 when it reached 
40 Mhl, but figures fell between 1991 and 1995. When the EU prepared the 
2008 wine reform, the EU Agricultural Commission estimated the structural 
surplus of wine to be 18.5 million hl. Finally, the 2008-2011 grubbing up 
scheme has reduced EU production by an estimated 10.2 million hl per year 
only, largely because the assumptions on which the initial target was based 
did not materialise (EU Commission, 2004; 2006a; 2011; 2012; Gaeta & 
Corsinovi, 2014). All the main EU wine-producing countries have suffered 
drops in production levels, albeit to differing extents. Currently, EU wine 
production is likely to reach 165.8 Mhl (while global production has reached 
274 Mhl): Italy has become the biggest producer in the world (49.5 Mhl), 
followed by France (47.5 Mhl) and Spain (37.2 Mhl). 
In particular, regarding the situation in the EU domestic market for table 
wine (TW) it has been characterised by an excess of production over demand 
(Graph 2). Data for the period 1980-2003 show that production of TW in 
the EU has decreased from 1,250 million hl in the wine year 1980/81 to 
75 million hl in the wine year 2002/03; a decrease of almost 40%. Stock 
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Graph 1 - Wine production: evolution in the main wine-producing countries (1,000 
hl)
Source: Authors’ creation from Eurostat database (2016)
Graph 2 - The dynamics of table wines in the domestic market (hl of wine)
Source: Authors’ creation from Eurostat database (2016)
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levels have fluctuated over the period but not always following the trend in 
production. In fact, some periods have witnessed decreases in production 
along with increases in stock and a reduction of consumption over the years. 
This is due to stock levels being determined by the combination of both 
production and consumption. Following the trend of production is distillation 
that has also fluctuated over the years (Innova, 2002). This was the sign that 
something had to change, starting a new phase. 
3. The second CMO phase: aims, instruments and costs 
The scenario of phase 2 was intended to improve the “quality of wines” 
(Table 1). The main interventions introduced on the vineyards have had an 
impact on the budgetary costs of the CMOs: a) incentive for the grubbing 
up vineyards located in unprofitable areas (permanent abandonment); b) 
restructuring and vineyards’ reconversion; c) green harvesting; d) harvest 
insurance. During this period, regulatory measures on geographical 
indications (GIs), as well as on oenological practices, were implemented. 
The grubbing up was introduced with the aim to create a wine sector 
adapted to market conditions by allowing less competitive vineyards to be 
permanently removed in areas where that activity was no longer profitable, 
giving them the opportunity to abandon agricultural production altogether. 
As indicated at the top level of Table 5, between 1991 and 2000 the aid 
accounted for 2 billion euros (15% of the total budget). The measure was 
heavily criticised in the CMO Reform in 2008 for the budget dedicated to it 
and the huge total area to be grubbed-up (150,000 ha). The majority of final 
support for grubbing up (promoted by the EU Commission proposal) was 
in fact to cushion the consequences of the withdrawal of market measures 
rather than to rebalance the market. However, during the three-year grubbing-
up scheme implemented between 2008/2011, a total of 161,167 hectares were 
grubbed-up with almost 1 billion Euro spent (EU Commission, 2011). 
The EU has always considered control over vineyards a necessity in order 
to avoid possible production increases. Following the Commission’s proposal, 
the Council decided to introduce a ban on any new plantings, in order to 
limit the production of table wines and prevent structural surpluses (EU 
Consilium, 2012; EU Parliament, 2012a). The ban was one of the main 
components of the CMO as it interacts with other instruments: the premium 
for permanent abandonment and the conversion scheme that could not be 
introduced without control on the vineyard area planted. This ban was 
initially set for the period between 1 December 1976 and 30 November 1978, 
but the expiry date for the planting rights regime was extended ten times 
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between 1976 and 2008 always on a transitional basis. The justifications 
were most frequently the permanent risk of “structural surpluses affecting 
the sector”, or “the tendency in the next few years for production to exceed 
foreseeable needs” (EU Commission, 2012). 
The new wine policy (Reg. 130/2013) abolished the total ban on the 
planting of new vineyards and replaced the transitional planting rights 
from 2016 to 2030 by a new system of authorisations for vine planting, for 
which Member States shall make available each year authorisations for 
new plantings corresponding to 1% of the total area actually planted with 
vines in their territory (as measured on 31 July of the previous year). The 
scheme of authorisations for vine plantings is based on the outcome of the 
High Level Group on Vine Planting Rights organised in 2012 (High Level, 
2012). As a replacement, personal authorisations are granted free of charge, 
which are no longer transferable to the market. Although this measure does 
not represent a cost item for the EU, it is increasing bureaucratic costs 
(Corsinovi et al., 2013; Deconinck & Swinnen, 2015; EU Parliament, 2012a; 
Meloni & Swinnen, 2016). In addition, the flexibility given by each Member 
State to decide their authorisation parametric is creating more restrictions 
to the wineries. Differently from what happened with the milk quota 
regime that has come to an end on 31 March 2015 and the sugar quotas 
scheme, which will come to an end on 30 September 2017, the wine reform 
brought a reversal of a decision which had already been taken to liberalise 
planting rights (Anania & Pupo D’Andrea, 2015). The EU Commission 
proposal of liberalization was overturned and the agreement reached in 
2013, was the result of an intense lobbying campaign and difficult political 
discussion at EU Council level. In this sense, the protectionist’s position 
of the historical wine producing countries (Italy, Spain and France) to 
maintain a regulated system has prevailed over the liberalist position of the 
EU Commission.
The restructuring and conversion of vineyards has become the cornerstone 
of the EU wine policies. The aim was to improve the quality of wines and by 
adapting their vineyards to market demand (varietal changes) through paying 
compensation for the loss of revenue while a vineyard is being adapted, and 
as a contribution to the costs of restructuring and conversion. 
Restructuring of vineyards has been designated with a budget in the 
decade 2001-2010 of 2.7 billion euros and 2.7 billion during 2010-2015 (Table 
5). Graph 3 shows the share of expenditures in the main EU wine producing 
countries (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Germany) and (in the right 
column) the total expenditures for all Member States. The fall registered in 
2009, is due to the interim period across the two Reforms (Reg. 1493/99 - 
479/2008) and the new programming scheme in the EU countries.
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Graph 3 - Restructuring & vineyards reconversion: expenditures (in 1,000 Euro) 
Source: Financial Report, European Commission (2016)
Among the instruments introduced to support quality wines, the “harvest 
insurance” introduced in the set of measures of the National Support 
Programme, contributes to protecting the producers’ financial status if 
affected by natural disaster, adverse climatic events, diseases or pest 
infestation. Harvest insurance has absorbed a limited amount of resources 
partly due to the fact that it can be funded using other cap measures.
One of the relevant aspects of the Phase 2 is represented by the inclusion 
of the quality regulation in the whole CMO from 1999 and the new EU 
wine classification from 2008. The Commission’s reform proposal started 
with some incontrovertible facts: communication relating to wine labelling 
needed to be simplified due to the complex designation system that assumed 
knowledge of the quality system. During this time the Commission heaped 
praise on the international model, but there were too many complexities and 
disparities between the two worlds. The first deregulation came in the form of 
clear labels, which were easy to remember. The second introduced different 
rules depending on the DO with complex and confusing labels that were 
difficult to read and remember. 
The new system reunited wines with origins in two categories, PDO and 
PGI. For wines with no origin as table wines, it proposed the categories 
varietal wines and non-varietal wines respectively. As regards PDO/PGI, 
the new rules implemented were in line with the aims of the wto-trips 
Agreement as well as the other agricultural products and foodstuffs PDO/
PGI regime (EU Commission, 2012). Who knows whether the real trade-off, 
which led to the adoption of the new classifications, was in fact the request 
for Appellation wines to receive greater protection within the wto. 
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3.1. The markets’ response to phase 2
In the twenty-five years from 1990, the total EU vine production area fell 
by 19% (from 4,168 million ha between 1986 and 1990 and 3,362 million 
ha). The downward trend visible on Graph 4 from the mid-1980s to the mid-
1990s can, in part, be attributed to the continued block on new plantings, due 
to both EU provisions and individual Member State choices, as well as to the 
incentives for distillation and private storage measures. However, the increase 
in area starting from 2003 was probably linked to the introduction of the 
2000-2006 programming period for the rural development plan (rdp), which 
characterised the second pillar of the cap with the introduction of measures 
linked to support the development of farms.
Graph 4 - Evolution of EU area under vine and the effect of policy interventions
Source: Authors’ creation from Eurostat database (2016)
The increase in quality wine production and its consumption (Graph 5) 
has probably paved the way to the third CMO phase (2008-2013). The year 
2008 was selected due to the new wine classification that included within the 
“Quality Wines” the “Geographical indication” wines, which were previously 
only indicated as table wine or IGT. Initially they were implemented to 
ease the production of cheap wines for daily consumption; over the years 
they become an important factor in providing a framework for innovative 
developments in the sector (Innova, 2002). 
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Graph 5 - The dynamics of quality wines in the domestic market (hl of wine)
Source: Authors’ creation from Eurostat database (2016)
4. The third CMO phase: aims, instruments and costs 
After more than thirty-eight years since the first (1970) CMO for wine, the 
third phase policy could be identified. Phase 3 was geared towards increasing 
the competitiveness of the EU wine sector in a worldwide market, mainly to 
counter the growing competitiveness of third country producers. One of the 
greatest fears for the EU Commission was the ‘incursion’ of new wine players 
on the EU market. Imports from New World wine countries have increased 
substantially, while the EU wine market has been confronted with a reduction 
in the demand for domestically produced wines as overall consumption of wine 
has decreased, especially in the most important wine procuring countries (EU 
Commission, 2006a). The importance of tackling the issue of consumption 
was one of the EU Commission’s “missions”, especially during the years of the 
second and third CMO phases. The UE introduced the promotion of quality 
wines in third countries as a real opportunities for improved competitiveness. 
Looking at the distribution of subsidies destined to support phase 3 (table 
6), promotion in third countries is the first largest expenditure category: 
between 2001-2010 122 million euros of EU funding has been spent 
to subsidise promotion and almost 750 million (11% of the budget) in the 
last six years. Regarding investment and innovation aids, implemented 
during phase 3 (Table 6), these essentially cover the similar scope as the 
Rural Development Programme investment aid measures of “modernization 
of agricultural holdings” and “adding value to agriculture and forestry 
products”. Demarcation problems with similar operations in rural development 
programmes have caused major problems during implementation and 
distribution. Here, the different interests within the wine lobby have 
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probably played an important role in the distribution of support within the 
EU States, that represents 12% of spending (on the total budget) from 2011 to 
2015.
Table 7 - Promotion in third countries: financial expenditures (in 1,000 Euro)
Year Total EU France Italy Spain Portugal Germany
Financial execution 
2009 35.18 18.42 4.86 6.98 2.95 462
2010 87.20 27.00 25.11 24.43 3.28 31
2011 111.65 20.05 48.51 29.69 6.11 1.02
2012 142.52 29.01 60.67 36.99 8.19 1.14
2013 145.43 17.09 73.58 38.00 9.22 1.22
2014 170.07 43.70 72.07 39.44 6.16 1.14 
2015 188.69 44.47 84.39 44.34 6.99 1.18
Total 2009/15 880.74 199.74 369.19 219.87 42.90 6.47
Source: European Commission, wine statistics database (2016)
Among the distribution in the main wine producing countries (Table 7), 
Italy is the first country with the highest value of spending (369 million 
Euro), followed by Spain (219 million Euro) and France (199 million Euro). 
The main beneficiaries were the Appellation of Origin as well as the 
temporary associations of businesses and producer groupings. For the most 
part, the resources were used by companies working in the United States, 
Canada, China and Japan to strengthen the markets. The majority of projects 
concentrated on joint participation in trade show events, contact with journalists 
from the countries of origin, and training activities for operators in the sector. 
4.1. The market response to phase 3: the consequence on the global wine 
trade 
International competition has been booming since the end of the 1990s, 
although its roots run deeper, and EU policies were very slow to realise the 
growing threat posed by this. 
The increase in areas under vines between 1995 and 2010 in third 
countries is significant and the global trend has been steady growth between 
2010 and 2012. Argentina, Chile, Australia and China represent the first 
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major sign of change in wine geography. China is one of the newcomers to 
the global wine scene and over the past 15 years it has seen its production 
area increase significantly (Graph 6). This country is the main driver of 
growth of the world area under vines and thus confirmed its position attained 
in 2014 as the country with the second largest vineyard area worldwide 
(830,000 ha), even if the data include the production of table grapes, which 
are very popular in China (oiv, 2014, 2016). On the production side, between 
1990 and 2010 (Graph 7), non-EU countries such as Chile, South Africa, 
Australia and China saw their now famous supply increase. The US was the 
first confirmed wine producers outside the EU (22.1 Mhl) that have seen 
some reductions since 2011-2012, followed by Argentina (13.4 Mhl), Chile 
(12.9 Mhl), Australia (11.9 Mhl) and China (11 Mhl) (Graph 7).
The scenario of the EU and the rest of the world’s consumption showed 
two situations: on one side, domestic consumption trends showed a decline 
(especially for table wine) in the main EU wine-producing countries (France 
43%; Italy 36% and 45% in Spain in the last fifteen years from 2000-2015) 
with only a few positive trends in Germany 0.8% and the UK with 28%. On 
the other side, there was a remarkable growth in wine consumption outside 
the EU (usa 32%, Canada 49%, China 49%, Russia, 53% and Australia 27% 
from 2000-2015) (oiv, 2014, 2016). However, the consumer attention has 
generated different reactions and sensitivity in the world market. 
Graph 6 - The EU’s competitors: evolution of area under vine (1,000 ha)
Source: Authors’ creation from oiv dataset (2016)*
Note: * 2014 – provisional and 2015 – forecasts. Vines for wine grapes; table grapes or dried 
grapes in production 
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Graph 7 - Dynamics in wine production in third countries (1,000 hl)
Source: Authors’ creation from oiv dataset (2016)*
Note: * 2014 – provisional and 2015 – forecasts 
The positive trend of exports to third countries of Quality wines (QW) 
compared to TW before the implementation of the competitiveness measures 
is shown in graph 8. Since 1980, there has been a rise in terms of quality 
wines, until 1995/96 and 1998/99 when the difference between the typologies 
was very low. From 1999, the gap between QW and TW was again 
pronounced in favour of quality. 
In trying to answer whether the promotion has achieved its expected 
impact within the EU, we can argue that the promotion was probably the 
best solution that the EU could imagine for its development, in accordance 
to the market trend of quality wines (Graph 8). The measure, as already 
stated, was implemented only in 2008 and a positive trend in exports was 
visible (Graph 9) especially in the US market. Since the beginning of the 
1990s, international trade in wine has increased at a surprising rate both in 
traditional producer and consumer countries and in emerging markets. Over 
the last decade, there has been the biggest increase in wine traded. Since 
2000, the international scenario has been dominated by the usa (3 Mhl) 
followed by China (2.8 Mhl in 2014), Russia (2.4 Mhl) and Switzerland (1.7 
Mhl) (Graph 9). However, some consideration regarding the implementation 
of new policy oriented to promote wine in the EU should be undertaken 
considering the trend “Intra EU import” that, in 2015, reached 46 Mhl (the 
volume imported by EU countries as CN 2204 traded): Germany (12.67 Mhl 
– in 2015) and the UK (7.19 Mhl) represent by far the leading destinations for 
EU wine imports (Graph 10) followed by France (6.67 Mhl). 
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Graph 8 - Quality and Table wines: export before promotion in third countries 
Source: Authors’ creation from Eurostat database (2016)
Graph 9 - Dynamics of EU exports (in volume) by destination 
Source: Eurostat Comext (2016)
The dynamic growth of the wine traded and the increase of export have 
been driven by a number of external and internal factors including policy 
interventions. The third phase was also characterised by an EU intervention 
towards bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the main commercial 
partners in order to facilitate trade between the EU and third countries. 
Before the 1994 Agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round of the gatt, 
the EU’s wine sector has been protected from imports from outside the EU 
through a variety of import restrictions (tariffs, the reference price system 
with its variable levies, relevant oenological measures and other non-tariff 
barriers). The growth of international trade and the progress of the wto 
have contributed to the progressive reduction of tariffs in the wine sector 
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(Dal Bianco et al., 2016; Mariani et al., 2012; Innova, 2002; Josling & 
Tangermann, 2015). The 1994 wto required the abolition of traditional 
variable import levies and of other measures and import charges provided 
for at the time. This meant the conversion of all measures restricting imports 
of agricultural products into customs duties and the prohibition of such 
measures in the future (Matthews et al., 2017). Today, tariff on wine depends 
on the importing countries and how they classify them: a) ad valorem 
(according to the price of the wine); b) volume based; c) alcohol contents; d) 
typologies (still, sparkling, bottled and bulk). They are very heterogeneous 
across the countries and they have changed over time, especially with the 
implementation of free trade agreements (FTAs). Anderson (2010), regarding 
the different level of tariffs, argues that tariff protection is quite low in 
countries with a long tradition of imports with respect to those that have 
recently experienced growing imports (as Asia). 
For example, considering the usa market, the general import duty rate 
applied in usa for import wine (including wine from EU) is 6.3 cent per liter 
($ 0.063) for container size of two liters or less of bottled wine by volume 
not over 14 %. For bulk containers (holding over 4 liters) duty rate is 14 cent 
per liter ($0.14). For several emerging markets those rates are still high with 
China at 14%, Russia at 20%, Brazil at 27%, Vietnam at 50% and India at 
150%6 (Sumner et al., 2011). Additional federal taxes are applied whether 
6. www.wineinstitute.org/international_trade_policy.
Graph 10 - Dynamics of intra-EU imports (in volume) by destination
Source: Eurostat Comext (2016)
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the wine is imported. The rate of taxations determined by alcoholic contents 
of product and the quantity and source of its effervescence. Importers of EU 
wines (with a registered license for import and the sale) are responsible for all 
applicable Federal excise taxes and duties on wines traded in usa. 
The duties on wine in EU are governed by Reg. 1031/2008. EU legislation 
splits trade in wine into three categories: bottled wine; bulk wine; and 
sparkling wine; with a separate nomenclature for grape musts and grape 
juice. These classifications are managed by the customs authorities making 
it possible to trace their trade flows with a high degree of precision The 
reason for these continued variations can be found in the duty applied to the 
various tariff lines. In recent years, many regulations have laid down rules for 
bottled wine tariffs and now use the international HS coding system, which 
is progressively reducing the pressure from sampling. The conventional rates 
of duty are applicable from 1 January 2010: the customs duties applicable 
to imported goods originating in countries which are Contracting Parties to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or with which the European 
Community has concluded agreements containing the most favoured nation 
tariff clause shall be the conventional duties shown in the following table. 
In the EU excise duties for alcohol are regulated through the Directive 
2008/118/EC, covers the general excise duty scheme and established a general 
regime for goods subject to excise duty with the aim of guaranteeing their 
free circulation and, therefore, the good functioning of the EU internal 
market. The excise duty levied by EU Member States on wine is fixed 
by volume of finished product. Member States may apply reduced rates 
of excise duty to any type of still wine and sparkling wine of an actual 
alcoholic strength by volume not exceeding 8,5% vol. having an actual 
alcoholic strength by volume exceeding 1,2% and 15 % vol., provided that the 
alcohol contained in the finished product is entirely of fermented origin. The 
motivation for taxing wine consumption is simply revenue seeking (Fogarty, 
2010).
However, experts observed that technical barriers are of increasing 
importance and there has been a growing use of them by governments 
in order to protect domestic markets. Non Tariff Measures, NTMs are 
of increasing importance and there has been a growing use of them by 
governments in order to protect domestic markets. NTMs represent a major 
challenge for the multilateral trading system as the “modern” forms of 
protectionism. Among the NTMs there is a great heterogeneous range of 
policies among countries including the protection of human health and the 
environment – the fact that trade is affected is a normal and legitimate 
consequence of such regulations. 
NTMs include technical measures to trade (such as ore shipment 
inspectation, technical barrier to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary rules) or 
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non-technical measures like to intellectual property or rules of origin7 (such 
GIs). A great debate that has characterized the last years of wine policies 
agreements has regarded the reduction of NTMs with the request to reduce 
the standard and import requirements and the protection of intellectual 
property. 
On March 10, 2006, the United States and EU signed a bilateral agreement 
on trade of wine for protection of wine names, recognition of winemaking 
practices and labeling. Thee agreement did not resolve the issue about 
the possibility of using names, which at that point were considered to be 
“semi-generic” and were then promoted to “generic”. As a consequence of 
this, American producers who in the past had marketed their wine under 
the names in question (such as Californian Chianti) could continue to do 
so. In this case, the problem is mostly linked to the incomplete nature 
of the trips agreement (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights) signed during the Uruguay Round of the gatt which introduced 
the issues relating to intellectual property rights (including geographical 
indications) still created confusion in the protection and recognition of GIs. 
The 2006 Agreements seems not to be the definitive solution with a strong 
opposition among the parties for guarantee the protection of GIs. Hopes of 
a transatlantic trade deal (ttip) between EU and USA have been abandoned 
following Trump’s election to the US presidency. After more than three years 
of negotiations and 15 rounds, negotiations with the US seems to be in stand 
by (or even failed). The EU has agreements awaiting adoption and under 
negotiation (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada; 
Singapore; Vietnam) for the abolition of wine duties, the recognition of GIs 
and the reduction of non-tariff measures (such as regulations and requests for 
standards, certifications, labelling and packaging characteristics). 
EU is also call to addressing the UK’s decision. How the EU and the 
UK will interact with each other when the UK will become a third states? 
After Brexit commercial relations between EU and UK will have to be 
renegotiated. EU companies may have to pay duties to export in the UK 
market, like in usa. Therefore, although the UK will be free from the 
constraints of the EU to trade with non-EU wine-producing countries such as 
South Africa, Australia and the US (De Filippis, 2016). 
Globalisation should leads to free trade between countries, however after 
the recent changes in the world scenario, the EU wine trade policies seem 
to be arrive late (or too late) to understand the competitive growth and the 
effects of globalisation. EU looks more a bystander still anchored to its 
protectionist’s policy and interests. 
7. http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab20122_en.pdf.
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Conclusion
Summarising the best and worst EU wine decisions, is the following 
concluding remark,
The wine example is an illustration of the tedious but largely unsuccessful attempts 
by the EU institutions to move toward a modern market policy focused on identified 
market failures and to be less captive to the farmer organisations (Bureau & Mahé, 
2015).
During more than 45 years of wine reforms, both internal and international 
measures described in the paper in three different phases, represent an 
example of compromise between protectionist and liberalist policy, with 
obviously different effects on the market. 
Concerning EU internal policy decisions, there can be no doubt after more 
than thirty years that the move to eliminate and reduce economic funds to 
market measures, like distillations (phase 1), was well intentioned; it aimed to 
increase the efficiency and competitiveness of the European wine sector. This 
move may have been too late with millions of Euro thrown in the garbage 
basket of a privileged lobby made of cooperatives and farmers who survived 
without a real market and only with the dedicated help of their deputies in 
the EU Parliament in phase one.
Again, there is no doubt that a concrete step forward in expenditure 
efficiency and policy response to the market was brought about by phase 
two, through the separation of quality wine regulation from table wine, 
which increased and strengthened, with PDOs and PGIs production, the 
characteristics of the EU quality wine on the world market. Restructuring and 
reconversion measures were probably the best and most efficient policies ever 
made, both by helping vine growers to rebuild their quality vineyards and 
readapt the grape varieties to consumer trends, 
Even the more controversial measure of grubbing up, aimed at the ‘EU 
chimera’ of market equilibrium, has helped the quality policy, by eliminating 
vineyards, especially in those areas that should not be allowed to be quality 
wine (PDO and PGI) production areas anyway. The question in this regard 
concerns the number of hectares used under this measure. The initial aim 
of the Commission to grub up 400,000 hectares was probably more efficient 
than the final figure of only 120,000 hectares. Another consequence was, 
indeed, that the EU holy mission of market equilibrium between supply 
and demand, based only on quotas or production, was strongly controlled, 
creating a bureaucracy over cost of production. A return to a protectionist 
regulation is obvious in the EU’s wine policy where the 2008 decision to 
liberalise the vineyard planting rights system was overturned in 2013 and a 
new set of regulations (authorisation) was implemented.
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Concerning the international EU policy interventions and the effect 
of what is defined as globalisation on the world wine market (Anderson 
& Golin, 2004), it is true that the wine sector is increasingly becoming 
an export oriented industry (Dal Bianco et al., 2016). Therefore, special 
evaluation of the EU international wine policy should be undertaken. 
International free-trade agreements continue to occupy Brussels’s 
bureaucrats without reaching any final agreements. Indeed, the world wine 
market has been over-regulated, and the effective level of protectionism has 
probably not changed at all (Foster & Spencer, 2002; Dal Bianco et al., 2016). 
The EU is still moving from the administration of protection – quotas, tariffs 
and subsidies – to the administration of precaution – security, safety, health and 
environmental sustainability. This is the new version of the old divide between tariff 
and non-tariff measures (Lamy, 2015)8.
We have witnessed the progressive growth of the so-called New World 
producers, who were considered weak competitors until the EU markets 
started to exhibit on their shelves wine from Australia and usa. But the 
problems, as we showed in the paper, had a long story related to their birth. 
After analysing the vineyard areas and wine production growth of third 
countries over the last 20 years, it is safe to say that the third phase of EU 
policy, aimed at correcting (or perhaps remedying) its own failings was 
implemented, and luckily has arrived, even if it may be too late. The CMO 
promotion measure (from 2008) was probably the best solution that the EU 
could imagine. Even if the ability to dispense the budget and the typical 
Eurocratic bureaucracy have made this policy difficult to use, the interest of 
wine farmers is increasing daily – as it should be as a result of this measure. 
The results of public allocation and measures seem to be identified in Rausser 
definitions about the PERTs and PESTs policy (Rausser, 1983). The policies 
that are generated to correct market inefficiencies and failure that have the 
aims to improve a hypothetical collective welfare system, PERTs policy, 
finish in configuration as PESTs intervention made for private interest of 
the decision makers (Rausser, 1983). It is also true to say that the European 
legislator created significant complications for the sector. In many cases, the 
legislator also granted the Member States the ability to implement important 
simplifications and it was national bureaucracy, which resulted in these not 
being introduced. Often when this kind of possibility is granted, people are 
concerned with how institutions and civil servant positions will continue 
to exist once there is no longer any reason for them and it is always nicer 
to be able to pass the buck. According to this, Tullock (1965) shows that 
a bureaucrat’s main interests lie in expanding bureaucracy. For individual 
8. www.ecipe.org/app/uploads/2015/02/PLamy-Speech-09.03.15.pdf.
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bureaucrats, this development has advantages in terms of power, respect, 
consideration from public decision-makers and influence on decisions. 
The classic dilemma between policymakers and markets, the trade-offs 
between markets and policies, still remain the drivers of the EU wine policy.
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